Compared to the general election of 2006, the electorate in 2011 appears to be more mature, in that a larger number of them are swing voters. They are less easily pigeonholed into pro-People’s Action Party or pro-opposition camps.
Even so, among young adults, the tertiary-educated and those in upper-middle-class households, the pro-opposition camp is about twice as large as the pro-PAP camp.
These findings came from a survey of about 2,000 eligible voters conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) in the fortnight after Polling Day.
In Part 1, the discussion was about the issues that voters considered important, the communication channels they considered influential upon them and the overall credibility of political parties. Here, we look at how political orientation and perceptions of political parties varied with respect to age, educational level and household income. The survey had also looked at the effect of gender, occupation, housing type, ethnic group and more factors, but variations in opinions are not as sensitive to these other factors as to age, education and household income.
* * * * *
Political orientation
IPS used three terms to classify political orientation: Conservative, Swing and Pluralist. Respondents were placed into these three classifications based on a matrix of questions, such as how important it was to have checks and balances.
The problem I have with these terms is that they are not particularly intuitive — especially as Conservative is more often used in a different sense — and though it may be slightly inaccurate to do so, for the purposes of this article I use the terms Pro-PAP, Swing and Pro-opposition. In the specific context of Singapore with a dominant party that argues for the status quo, Conservative would in effect mean Pro-PAP. At the other end of the spectrum, those who believe in a more plural political system would in the present Singapore context be seen as pro-opposition.
The striking thing from the data is that except for young adults, the Swing category in 2011 has grown from 2006. This growth came at the expense of both pro-PAP and pro-opposition camps (except senior citizens). Voters may be becoming more eclectic, or even tactical, in their choices. They may be more concerned with issues and proposed solutions, rather than party label.
The 16 percent aged 21 – 29 however tilt markedly to the opposition. They are the only group where the Swing category is not the largest.
The next bar graph shows how significant education is to the formation of political opinion. Pluralist or pro-opposition views get stronger as the educational level goes up.
Educational level correlates with income, and the next chart, based on household income, shows a similar trend.
These are loud warning bells for the PAP. As a party reputed to favour the elite, it is striking how it is failing to win the hearts of the better-educated and the better-off. Instead, it is increasingly relying on the support of the educationally and economically disadvantaged. Yet, the widening income gap and wage stagnation points to increasing frustration among the disadvantaged. For now, they may be voting for the PAP as a default option, perhaps because opposition parties still find it hard to reach them since this demographic group is less connected to the internet, and reaching them through retail politics is very resource-demanding. But when the day comes that the disadvantaged realise that there are meaningful alternatives to the PAP, they may turn against the PAP with a vengeance.
The other warning bell for the PAP is how it is losing the next cohort of voters. The leading indicator can be seen in the 21-29 age group where those with Pluralist/pro-opposition orientation outnumber those with pro-PAP orientation by two to one.
Why does the educational and economic elite not strongly support the PAP? It can’t be because of many specific policies since these have in the main benefitted them. My guess is that it’s probably got to do with style, and perhaps humanity/idealism. Precisely because they are better educated, they find it hard to stomach what they perceive as a top-down, arrogant style. They may also be chafing at civil liberty issues (although the survey did not ask about these). Thirdly, just because they are better-off does not mean they lack compassion or idealism about fairness and social justice. Being economically secure themselves, such ideals may even be stronger in them.
Here again, the PAP should be very concerned. To win these voters back may require a complete revolution in how the party goes about governing. Both ends and means have to be upended, but as far as I can see, such a revolution is nowhere on the horizon.
The data supporting the above three graphs can be seen from the thumbnail at right.
* * * * *
Perception of parties
The next three graphs show how voters perceive the credibility of the seven parties that participated in the 2011 general election, according to age, education and household income. It is obvious from all the graphs that the PAP and Workers’ Party (WP) stand head and shoulders above the rest.
In yet another danger signal for the PAP, among young adults, the WP has the same credibility score as the ruling party.
In general, those under 40 years of age view most of the other opposition parties more favourably than their older peers.
The graphs for the PAP and WP are different in the second chart compared to the one above. The lines (nearly) converge as educational levels go up.
In the discussion above, it was pointed out that Pluralist or pro-opposition political orientation rises with education. Here you see it in finer grain, in that the support really goes to just one opposition party — WP. There is no increasing support for other opposition parties as educational levels go up, with the possible exception of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP). But why so? Why the WP and possibly SDP? Is it because the WP is considered a “safer” bet compared to other, “wilder” opposition parties? Is it because the SDP is more idealistic, or simply more internet-savvy?
Likewise, the WP is viewed more favourably by the better-off than by the less well-off.
IPS’ survey data supporting the fourth to sixth graphs (Credibility of political parties) can be seen by clicking the thumbnail at left.
* * * * *
The new normal or old normal?
Part of the seminar discussion revolved around the theme of whether Singapore is moving towards a new normal. Sociologist Chua Beng Huat argued that “liberalisation of Singapore is not avoidable, because the only competitive edge we have in Singapore is education”. As you would have seen from the charts above, education is perhaps the chief driver of shifting political opinions.
Moreover, we’ve already seen a key break from the past. “One of the major factors,” Chua added, “is the retirement of Lee Kuan Yew. A lot of the authoritarianism of the past was due to one man’s personality.”
Lam Peng Er seemed more ambivalent, noting that former prime minister Goh Chok Tong promised a more consultative government way back in 1990. I think he was alluding to how in 2011, the PAP is still promising the same.
Yet, noting that if the PAP loses another 5 percentage points in vote share, it could lose more group representation constituencies such as Marine Parade and East Coast, Lam wondered why the PAP has become so quiet after the election. “Why is the feedback mechanism malfunctioning?”
Chua (right) felt we could stagnate at this level for a while. Although “there is a change in [voters’] mentality, and while the political consciousness has changed . . . but does the political culture allow that liberalisation to express itself?” He foresees the PAP remaining as the dominant party for another twenty years. After that? Perhaps “we may become more like India” — with no party getting an outright majority.
Both Chua and IPS Deputy Director Arun Mahizhnan thought we shouldn’t lose the historical perspective. Singapore had a vibrant political culture fifty years ago. We are not so much moving to a new normal, but re-normalising after a long period of the abnormal. We even “accepted that abnormality to be the only way things should be,” Chua observed.
Among the odd things that we have in Singapore is the Straits Times. It is “a very strange newspaper; it always reports the future,” he said. Whenever it writes about an issue, it will report what the government will do some time in the future in relation to it.
Coming back to the question of new normal or old normal, perhaps it is too soon to tell. Perhaps the changes we saw in 2011 are not that significant. “We are so starved of change,” Chua cautioned, “that we make every little change to be the start of the next big thing.”
Yawning Bread 
This is so true! ” Thirdly, just because they are better-off does not mean they lack compassion or idealism about fairness and social justice. Being economically secure themselves, such ideals may even be stronger in them.”
After (being able to) taken care of ourselves, our family, we feel a stronger sense of addressing/contributing to the promotion of Social Justice.
“Among the odd things that we have in Singapore is the Straits Times. It is “a very strange newspaper; it always reports the future,” he said. Whenever it writes about an issue, it will report what the government will do some time in the future in relation to it.”
Very true. Among the phrases I detest when speaking to quasi/government servants: “Going forward…”
To which I respond: “No, you’re not going anywhere, yet. Let’s stick to the here-and-now, right now!”
Hey,
Let’s call a spade a spade.
LKY’s et al sole and only objective is the continued domination of this island for his own purpose and glorification. Practically ,EVERYTHING esp. what have now become public knowledge, but previously concealed or only privy only to a few, points to an agenda not of nation building, not of a general uplifting of the society at large and least of all the establishment of a vigorous, democratic and self renewing system.
On the contrary, it is all about domination by a selected few (on whom I wouldn’t bestow the title of ‘elite’ of any sort) of what is best described as a band of mercenary political usurpers.
Everything that the country had achieved, has been achieved for the sake of one man’s glorification. A man who exercised his powers not like the leader in a democratic state, but as a feudal lord, under whose lordship the country has to twist, turn and distort to suit his many and constantly changing whims and fancies. Where the law is often contorted to suit his wishes and ends at any given material point of time.
I think the findings suggest that PAP should open up the political space and public sphere to take the sting of uneven playing field away. It may be a case of damnned if you do and damned if you don’t for the ruling party but I suspect they’ll keep resisting these changes/reforms until the inevitable loss of parliamentary majority or the demise of LKY.
Unfortunately, the here-and-now is all PAP.
Going forward, there seems to be some hope for a better Singapore.
looking at the three diagrams on “political orientation”, while PAP has much to worry about, opposition should be worried too: there is no overall increase in pro-opposition percentage from 2006 to 2011; the increase is in swing voters, who showed a greater tendency to swing towards opposition this time; that is, if in the next 5 years PAP succeeds in implementing more people friendly policies, or run a a better 2016 campaign (“both” is perhaps too much to ask – I am a pessimist), then its vote could very well swing back; some sign of this was already present in the 2011 result for Ang Mo Kio: the PAP vote there went up, mainly because LHL humbly apologized for some of the government’s failures
the very positive numbers WP received in voter perception of credibility should also worry the other opposition parties (in addition to its predominant success in getting MPs into Parliament, elected or NCMP) – donations and members/candidates will all flow towards WP, leaving the others to fight for scraps; the 2016 scene is likely to be very different from the 2011 scene
the fact the better educated/wealthier voters are less likely to support PAP despite its elitist orientation, perhaps can be explained this way: most of the people in the group would like to be even more elite but feel they have already hit the ceiling in the current system; again, it should worry the opposition that people in these groupings did not become more pro-opposition between 2006 and 2011
one issue not covered in the survey – the excitement aroused by Mr Chen Show Mao, who has had little politcal track record and community involvement and is basically an unknown quality as a politician, reveals something typically Singaporean: people admire impressive scholastic records and business successes; yet, PAP is criticized for placing too much emphasis of these; another thing revealed is that people do not place much weight on long party affiliation, ideological identification, etc. Politics is merely another career choice, just as PAP has always practised
/// that is, if in the next 5 years PAP succeeds in implementing more people friendly policies, or run a a better 2016 campaign (“both” is perhaps too much to ask – I am a pessimist), then its vote could very well swing back; some sign of this was already present in the 2011 result for Ang Mo Kio: the PAP vote there went up, mainly because LHL humbly apologized for some of the government’s failures. ///
Swinging towards the PAP because it has bucked up and implemented more people friendly policies is a good and logical outcome – no?
I humbly disagree with you on the reason for the better Ang Mo Kio performance. If you notice, there is an almost across-the board drop in votes for the PAP in all constituencies.
Ang Mo Kio’s PAP votes went up marginally against the trend. But remember, AMK is the mothership of PM Lee – his own constituency. If you are the PAP’s strategist, what would you do? Right – pad it up with pro-PAP voters by redrawing the electoral boundary. It is important to note that Hougang is just right next door sharing the same boundary. Low Thia Khiang has held that ward for so long, and given his extreme popularity, it is a foregone conclusion that it will be almost impossible to dislodge him. So, I think what happened was that the PAP has given up hope of winning back Hougang. Therefore, pro-PAP voters in Hougang were moved into AMK, and the pro-opposition voters in AMK were moved to Hougang. This is supported by the fact that Yaw Shin Leong, despite being a rookie and relative unknown, scored an even higher winning margin than Low Thia Khiang did in the previous election.
So, I don’t think it is the apology that improve AMK’s performance. It is the gerrymendering that did it.
I give no opinion on whether the redrawing of boundaries produced gerrymandering – you (and anti PAP people) are free to hypothesize, but there is no concrete evidence either way; I merely remark that putting pro-PAP voters into AMK just to satisfy LHL’s vanity seems a waste; it would have been more beneficial for PAP to have moved more of its supporter areas taken out of Hougang southward into Aljunied rather than westward into AMK
Ben (13.07.11 14:18) is correct. Neither the apology nor gerrymandering were factors in AMK. The only significant factor was that Lee Hsien Loong ran against JBJ’s son rather than against Low Thia Khiang. As the electoral results and IPS’ survey show, the RP has the lowest credibility among all the opposition parties (for good reason).
/// I merely remark that putting pro-PAP voters into AMK just to satisfy LHL’s vanity seems a waste ///
No, not just the vanity factor. It was a real desperate move for survival. Have you forgotten that in the previous election, a team of young punks, the so-called suicide squad, was able to reduce the AMK PAP’s vote share to below the national average of 66.6%.
Voting out a popular Foreign Minister plus a couple of other ministers was a shock. Can you imagine the earthquake if the PM were to be voted out?
both of you are just hypothesizing, but I do have the following data:
1. RP received 33% in west coast, 30% in AMK;
2. Hougang has 24000 voters, AMK has 179000
my deduction: PAP did something right in AMK, but Hougang has too few votes to make much impact even if there was shuffling of pro-PAP votes to AMK
the 2006 PAP vote in AMK was 66.1%; just 0.5% below the national average; again adopting the same kind of hypothesizing about LHL’s apology: I believe he was hurt in 2006 for talking about “fixing” the opposition, and by his father’s harping on James Gomez(just as George Yeo was punished for pursuing the issue – that incident cost PAP dearly, with Yeo’s low vote, WP identified Aljunied as a PAP weak point, put special effort into it, and won it handsomely in 2011).
You’ve got a good point there. The opposition too has reason to worry. Swing voters aren’t going to vote for an opposition party just because they’re not the PAP. Increasingly, each opposition party needs to stand for something. It doesn’t yet have to be specific solutions to specific problems (unless it is within striking distance of forming the next government), but should at least articulate its overall vision or direction, so voters know what they are voting for. Swing voters pick and choose and have no party loyalty (or anti-loyalty).
I think both you and yuen do raise good points, but I have been concerned about the overuse of the term “swing voters” (just about everywhere lately) even though I agree with both your observations about this group. The reason is that what I think I saw at GE2011 was more “protest voters” who by definition exist only so long as the reason/s for protest exist. This too is worrying for the opposition parties especially from studying the progressively downward vote share for the PAP in the 80s and a reversal of that trend in the 90s, and attributing reasons – protest in the 80s and the (superficial) removal of the reasons for protest in the 90s – for both.
Swing voters, on the other hand, are a factor at every election whether or not any reason for protest exists. As you have said, they tend to have the maturity to scrutinize issues and thus use those capabilities at every polls.
On another note, while I have thoroughly enjoyed all the post-elections analyses presented here – I am thrilled that we have arrived at this stage in our political maturity – I too would like to see some other types of analysis included in the future though by no means do I suggest that it is you who should do it; I’m just throwing the suggestion out there to anyone able and so inclined. I would like to see data from surveys that include questions such as these:
1a) How had you intended to vote before you either knew of or received the grow and share package?
1b) If you answered “the opposition” in 1a), how did you eventually vote?
The above questions would provide empirical data about the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the PAP’s practise of pre-elections handouts.
The next question might only be for Ang Mo Kio GRC residents only, but I can see its relevance to the entire electorate. Thus, respondants could be seperated into two groups: AMK residents and non-AMK residents.
2a) How had you intended to vote just before Lee Hsien Loong apologized for his government’s poor performance at the PAP’s rally held in the CBD?
2b) (This question can be phrased in many ways.) How did you eventually vote?
The fir
I would like to echo yuen’s point, and Alex’s acknowledgement of it.
I would only add the observation that the categories ‘Swing’ and ‘Pluralist’ are still very PAP-centric in nature. Politics and political discourse in Singapore exhibits a strongly negative streak — we are better able to articulate what we dislike or don’t want rather (which is a legitimate thing to do) than to put in words what we positively want or desire (something which I believe Alex has mentioned before).
With the above in mind, I would go out on a limb and say this, which amounts in my opinion to a sorry observation on Singaporean politics — it is easier for the PAP to hold onto to power and continue to dominate Singaporean politics than it is for other political parties to gain ground. In other words, Singaporeans have grown rather comfortable with the PAP’s brand of authoritarianism.
Still, even if it is as easy for the PAP as I have painted it, it begs the question: just how did they manage to screw up so badly this time?
Regards,
SN
Someone correct me if I’m wrong; I’m not great at reading statistics. According to the Key Household Incomes Trends 2010 on the Singstat website (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/papers/people/pp-s17.pdf), the median household income in 2010 was $5704, and the average household income for the 41st – 60th decile was between $6000 and $7000. I assume therefore that this would roughly represent the income of the middle-middle class. The IPS study seems to have lumped the top 40% of earners into one demographic – ‘$7k and above’. The household income divisions make it appear as though those earning $7000 and above should be considered ‘upper class’ when, in fact, they span the top 40% of earners? That seems odd to me. Wouldn’t it be more reasonable to consider the upper class as the top 20% of earners, which according to the Singstat report would be those earning $12k and above? In fact, given that the income of the 91st – 100th decile is nearly double that of the 81st – 90th decile ($24k vs $13k), the upper class really seems to constitute only the top 10% of earners. Like yourself, I am particularly interested in class distinctions. Unfortunately I don’t think the IPS study provides particular insight into the political attitudes of the upper-middle and upper class. I have a sense that there are some appreciable differences between the top 40% and top 20% of earners, and again between the top 20% and top 10% of earners. I would also be particularly interested in how different demographics prioritise issues like income inequality or civil liberties, just to get a clearer sense of where they lie on the political spectrum and their attitudes towards social justice and freedoms. I’m sometimes inclined to think, somewhat cynically, that electorate is sort of reactionary and governed less by specific values or ideals.
Having just seen the full IPS presentation (http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/events/post-election/PEF_report_080711.pdf) I stand somewhat corrected; they have labelled the $7k and above group as ‘Upper Middle’. However, 40% still seems like an awfully large group to be lumped into one demographic, and statistics are not provided for the upper class.
People always under-report their income in surveys. Especially household income, because who knows how much everyone else in the house earns 🙂
Based on hh income reported by respondents (page 12 in the link), $7K corresponds to top 15%. Median income appears to be in the $4K-4.5K range (also lower than DOS’ number, which is based on administrative data). You can make your own guesses as to whether members of high-income households are more or less likely to answer telephone surveys than members of low-income households. Overall, though, I would be comfortable with classifying the >$7K income group in the survey as high-income households.
Incidentally, be careful with confounding middle-income and middle-class. They are not the same. In any case, many high-income people like to think of themselves as “middle-class”, partly because they see many others richer than themselves, and partly because “middle-class”ness is all in the mind, not in the wallet.
If SDP and NSP can consolidate their top talents to contest in two or three GRCs, they could have won.
From the results of 2011 GE, the quality of candidates was the most important criteria when voters decide. That is why WP won in Aljunied and RP lost in Ang Mo Kio.
Alex,
Is it okay if use a number of your charts/graph for a blog article?
Yes, just credit source.
/// yuen 14 July 2011 at 06:25
both of you are just hypothesizing, but I do have the following data:
1. RP received 33% in west coast, 30% in AMK;
2. Hougang has 24000 voters, AMK has 179000 ///
How do you account for the fact that a rookie like Yaw Shin Leong can win Hougang, and win with an even higher margin that Low Thia Khiang?
Putting in a “disciple” does not ensure retaining the seat. See how Potong Pasir fared – the votes are largely not transferable to the anointed one. The only logical explanation is that Potong Pasir was re-capturable given the tremendous resources put in by the PAP candidate. Hougang is a gone case given LTK’s popularity and the Teo Chew base – hence a good strategy to give it up and move the pro-PAP voters to AMK. No need to move to Aljunied as they thought they could retain it with 2 ministers and 1 minister of state and potential speaker.
So what if Hougang has 24000 voters and AMK 179000. Assuming that just 10% (2400 voters) of the pro-PAP voters in Hougang are moved to AMK, and 2,400 pro-opposition voters in AMK moved to Hougang – that would be a swing party of 4,800 voters. That will be a potential 2.7% swing. I don’t think AMK improved by that much.
>a rookie like Yaw Shin Leong can win Hougang
he received 2% more than Low in 2006; since the PAP national average went down by 6%, you could say changing horse cost WP 4%; in fact WP was on a roll – its Aljunied vote went up by nearly 11%, so maybe the change cost WP 9%
>Assuming that just 10% (2400 voters) of the pro-PAP voters in Hougang are moved to AMK,
in every HDB block there are both PAP and PAP voters; moving 2400 PAP voters brings with it a lot of WP voters too; you dont get a net gain of 2400
as you see, this issue cannot be easily analyzed; you are free to hypothesize your way, I mine
I used to wonder how the situation in countries like North Korea came to be. How did the people allow a cruel and selfish tyrant to stay in power & “live like a king” while they struggled to eke out a not-so-decent living. How such a leader could then pass on power to his son and this son on to his son.
Then I realised that instead of looking outside at other countries, I should, in fact, be looking at my own country Singapore and asking the same questions. How did I allow such a similar situation in my country?
It is time for us Singaporeans to sit up and realise that THIS IS OUR COUNTRY AND IT IS US WHO MADE IT WHAT IT IS TODAY! Yes, LKY did a lot to help us get to where we are but he did it with an able team, not singlehandedly as many Singaporeans continue to mistakenly believe.
And yet, he has successfully managed to take centre stage by himself and put his able team members in the shade. So successfully, in fact, that most young Singaporeans do not, or did not until recently, know who people like Goh Keng Swee, S. Rajaratnam, Toh Chin Chye were. His fellow founding fathers have even fallen out with him after disagreeing with his methods but have chosen to stay silent to avoid incurring his wrath and backlash. We understand their fear and know only too well what this powerful and evil man will do and has done to anyone who crosses his path.
After playing our part in making Singapore what it is today, what did we get in return? His contempt for us – he is always blaming us, the people, every time he or the government screws up (Family Planning, Social Engineering, Foreign Talent and Population Increase and many more recent mistakes). After bringing in so many foreigners (to make up for votes they’ve been losing) and even foreign students (with all expenses paid, not just scholarships) while Singapore parents struggle with their children’s school-related and other expenses, he has the nerve to say without a care that if we Singaporeans cannot keep up with these foreigners, that just too bad!
How else have we Singaporeans been rewarded for helping to make our country what it is today? They take away our pensions and give it exclusively to themselves with many of us facing the grim prospect of not having enough CPF for our twilight years (I have almost nothing left after using most of it to purchase my 4-room flat). They keep increasing everything (public transportation, ERP, public housing, domestic worker levies etc.) while our wages remain stagnant and we receive token bonuses every year (while the FTs take home sky-high bonuses). The result? We have the lowest wages and domestic purchasing power among the Asian Tigers (see An Analysis of the UBS Report by Eugene Yeo).
And what do we do in return after being slapped with all these whammies? We still revere him as a demi-god and name universities and colleges and libraries after him and his wife.
Let’s stop and take stock of what’s happening here. Imagine investing your hard-earned money building your house only to find, upon completion, strangers moving in and taking over the place and leaving you with the kitchen floor to sleep on. Wouldn’t you feel mad? You should because that’s exactly what’s happening to us Singaporeans today!
We’re just beginning to see what we can achieve by monitoring and calling to task those WE put in power – an apology from LHL, them admitting their mistakes for the 1st time and making insincere promises, HDB & DBSS, TT’s son’s special treatment etc. Let us, the masters, keep up the momentum and show our “servants”, through the ballot box, what we think of the way we’re being treated.